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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge 






 This appeal arises out of the Chapter 11 liquidation of 
KB Toys Inc. and affiliated entities (the “Debtors”).  Pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), the Residual Trustee of the KBTI 
Trust1 sought to disallow certain trade claims that ASM 
Capital, L.P., and ASM Capital II, LLP, (together, “ASM”) 
obtained from some of the creditors.  Under § 502(d), a 
bankruptcy claim can be disallowed if a claimant receives 
property that is avoidable or recoverable by the bankruptcy 
estate.  See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d).  The issue here is whether a 
trade claim that is subject to disallowance under § 502(d) in 
the hands of the original claimant is similarly disallowable in 
the hands of a subsequent transferee.   For the reasons set 





 Creditors holding claims against an entity who has 
filed a Chapter 11 petition sometimes face a risky and lengthy 
bankruptcy process.  To avoid this risk and expense, a 
creditor may look to sell its claim, a practice permitted under 
the bankruptcy rules.  In re Kreisler, 546 F.3d 863, 864 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)).  By selling its 
claim, a risk averse creditor can opt out of the bankruptcy 
process and obtain an immediate, albeit discounted, payment 
on the debt it is owed.  See id.  Claim purchasers buy these 
claims and hope to receive a distribution from the debtor’s 
estate in excess of the price paid.  See Tally M. Wiener & 
Nicholas B. Malito, On the Nature of the Transferred 
                                              
 1 The Debtors’ plan of reorganization established the 
KBTI Trust.  The KBTI Trust is authorized to liquidate and 
collect assets for the benefit of creditors. 
4 
 
Bankruptcy Claim, 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 35, 36 (2009) (“Some 
purchasers are simply . . . investing with an eye towards 
receiving a distribution on claims in cash or readily liquidated 
property in excess of the purchase price.”).2    
 
A trade claim is usually transferred via contract.  If a 
claim is transferred before a proof of claim is filed, Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(1) allows a transferee 
to file the proof of claim.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e)(1).   
If a claim is transferred after a proof of claim is filed, Rule 
3001(e)(2) requires a claims transferee to file an “evidence of 





The Debtors filed voluntary petitions for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 14, 2004 (the 
                                              
 2 Other claims purchasers attempt to make a profit in 
more sophisticated ways.  For example, in reorganizations, 
some purchasers seek to purchase claims from a particular 
class of claims with a view toward receiving equity interests 
in the reorganized debtor.  See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in 
Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors’ 
Objectives, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 69, 82 (2008) 
(reporting that many claims purchasers invest in bankruptcy 
cases to pursue an exchange of debt for equity).   This was 
not ASM’s goal. 
3 ASM does not challenge any of the factual findings 
made by either the Bankruptcy Court or the District Court.  
ASM Br. at 13 (“[O]nly the legal conclusions—and not any 
factual findings—of the courts below are challenged.”).  
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“Petition Date”) to liquidate all of their assets.  On March 15, 
2004, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iii), each 
Debtor filed a Statement of Financial Affairs (“SOFA”).  
Each SOFA required the disclosure of all payments made 
within the 90 days immediately preceding the Petition Date.  
Payments made during this 90-day time period are potentially 
vulnerable to attack as avoidable preferences.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(b)(4)(A). 
 
 Between April 7, 2004 and May 22, 2007, ASM, 
which participates in the sale and purchase of bankruptcy 
claims nationwide, purchased the nine claims at issue in this 
appeal (the “Claims”) via Assignment Agreements.  The 
Claims were originally held by various trade claimants (the 
“Original Claimants”) to whom the Debtors owed money.  
The Assignment Agreements underlying the transfers of four 
of the Claims contained a generic indemnification clause.  
Five did not.  Each Assignment Agreement contained specific 
restitution provisions that dealt with risks particular to 
bankruptcy.  These provisions shift the risk of disallowance 
back to the Original Claimant by requiring the Original 
Claimant to pay restitution to ASM if the Claim is 
disallowed.4     
                                              
 4 The restitution provisions took one of two forms.  In 
one set of agreements, the restitution provisions provided: 
“[i]n the event . . . the Claim . . . is avoided, disallowed, 
expunged, reduced or is otherwise subordinated . . . in whole 
or in part, [the Original Claimant] . . . agrees to make 
immediate Restitution.”  App. 132, 135, 270, 273.  In the 
other set of agreements, the restitution provisions provided: 
“[the Original Claimant] agrees to make to [ASM] immediate 




 Each Original Claimant was listed on a SOFA as 
receiving a payment within 90 days of the Petition Date.  The 
Trustee brought preference actions5 against the Original 
Claimants, eventually obtaining a judgment in each case. The 
judgments against the Original Claimants were uncollectable 
because the Original Claimants all went out of business.  
ASM purchased eight of the Claims before the Trustee 
commenced the preference actions and purchased one after 
the Trustee obtained a judgment.   
 
 On July 31, 2009, the Trustee filed an objection with 
the Bankruptcy Court seeking the disallowance of the Claims 
pursuant to § 502(d).  The Trustee did not allege that ASM 
itself received an avoidable transfer.  Instead, the Trustee 
contended that the Claims are disallowable under § 502(d) 
                                                                                                     
Price to the extent the Claim is . . . avoided, disallowed, 
expunged, reduced or subordinated for any reason whatsoever 
in whole or in part . . . .”  App. 117, 120, 123, 126, 129. 
5 To succeed in a preference action, a trustee must 
show that a transfer: (1) was to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) was for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the 
debtor before such transfer was made; (3) was made while the 
debtor was insolvent; (4) was on or within 90 days before the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (5) enabled the creditor 
to receive more than it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation.  
11 U.S.C. § 547(b).  Preference actions, among other things, 
“facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of 
distribution among creditors of the debtor.  Any creditor that 
received a greater payment than others of its class may be 
required to disgorge the payment so that all may share 
equally.”  5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 547.01 (16th ed. 2010). 
7 
 
because each Original Claimant received a preference before 
transferring its Claim to ASM. 
 
 After considering the language of § 502(d) and its 
legislative history, the Bankruptcy Court disallowed the 
Claims, concluding that a claims purchaser holding a trade 
claim is subject to the same § 502(d) challenge as the original 
claimant.  Put differently, the Bankruptcy Court held that, 
under § 502(d), “[d]isabilities attach to and travel with the 
claim.”  App. 76.  The Bankruptcy Court also observed that 
ASM is a sophisticated entity, well aware of the bankruptcy 
process, who had access to both the SOFA and the Original 
Claimants, and thus, was on “constructive notice” of the 
potential preference actions and could have discovered the 
potential for disallowance under § 502(d) with “very little due 
diligence.”  App. 88.  Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court 
held that ASM was not entitled to protection as a “good faith” 
purchaser. 
 
 ASM appealed the decision to the District Court, 
which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court.  The District Court 
noted that it believed the plain language of § 502(d) was 
ambiguous but it otherwise adopted the reasoning of the 
Bankruptcy Court.  ASM appealed.6 
                                              
 6 We exercise plenary review of a decision of a district 
court sitting as an appellate court in a bankruptcy proceeding.  
In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review 
the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact under the clearly 
erroneous standard, its conclusions of law under a de novo 
standard, and its exercises of discretion for abuses thereof.  
Id. at 227-28.  The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction 








 Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section, the court shall disallow any claim of 
any entity from which property is recoverable 
under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title 
or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable 
under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 
548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such 
entity or transferee has paid the amount, or 
turned over any such property, for which such 
entity or transferee is liable under section 
522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (emphasis added).  The issue in this case, 
which only concerns trade claims, turns on the interpretation 
of the phrase “any claim of any entity.”    
 
 The Court’s analysis begins with the text of the statute.  
If the text is clear and unambiguous, this Court must simply 
apply it.  Roth v. Norfalco L.L.C., 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“When the meaning of statutory text is plain, our 
inquiry is at an end.”).  Yet courts must be mindful, 
particularly when examining the Bankruptcy Code, that 
statutory interpretation is “a holistic endeavor.”  Official 
                                                                                                     
had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and 
1334.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(d) and 1291. 
9 
 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (quotation and citation omitted).  
Consequently, courts “must not be guided by a single 
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions 
of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”  Id. (quotation 
and citation omitted).  If the statutory text is ambiguous, a 
court may look to the legislative history.  Blum v. Stenson, 
465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).   
 
 The language of § 502(d) states that “any claim of any 
entity” who received an avoidable transfer7 shall be 
disallowed.  Thus, the statute operates to render a category of 
claims disallowable—those that belonged to an entity who 
had received an avoidable transfer.  Further, the statute 
provides that such claims cannot be allowed until the entity 
who received the avoidable transfer, or the transferee, returns 
it to the estate.  11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (stating that the trustee 
shall disallow such claims “unless such entity or transferee 
has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for 
which such entity or transferee is liable . . .”).  Accordingly, 
“any claim” falling into this category of claims is 
disallowable until the avoidable transfer is returned.  Because 
the statute focuses on claims—and not claimants—claims that 
are disallowable under § 502(d) must be disallowed no matter 
who holds them. 
 
                                              
 7A transfer of property can be avoided under one of the 
various avoidance sections.  For example, a trustee or a 
debtor in possession may avoid preferential transfers under 11 




 To hold otherwise would contravene the aims of § 
502(d), the first of which is to ensure equality of distribution 
of estate assets.  Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. 
(In re Enron Corp.) (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); see also Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559 (noting that 
courts must look to a law’s “object and policy” when 
interpreting the law).  If a transferred claim was protected 
from disallowance, an original claimant who received an 
avoidable transfer would have an incentive to sell its claim 
and “wash” the claim of any disability.  After all, if the 
original claimant did not transfer its claim, the claim would 
be disallowed pursuant to § 502(d).  If the original claimant 
could transfer the claim for value to a transferee, the original 
claimant would receive value for a claim that would 
otherwise be disallowed and the transferee, who would 
receive the claim “washed” of its disability, could then share 
in the distribution of estate assets.  In short, the original 
claimant would have an incentive to sell its claim—so it 
could receive some value for an otherwise valueless claim—
and the transferee would have an incentive to buy the claim—
because once the claim is in its hands, the claim is eligible to 
receive a distribution.   
 
 Allowing such a result would negatively impact the 
other creditors in two ways.  First, because the original 
claimant has not returned the avoidable transfer, the estate has 
less money and the other creditors would receive smaller 
amounts from the estate because it would not include the 
unreturned preference payment or conveyance.  Second, the 
estate would pay on a claim that would have been otherwise 




 This result would also undermine the second of § 
502(d)’s aims, coercing compliance with judicial orders.  
Enron II, 379 B.R. at 434.  Section 502(d) can be used to 
compel an original claimant to comply with a judgment and 
return the preferential payment as a condition of collecting on 
its claim.  Failure to satisfy this condition provides a basis for 
the trustee to ask the bankruptcy court to disallow the claim.  
After the claim is sold, the original claimant no longer has a 
claim that the trustee can leverage to obtain the disgorgement 
of the preference payment.  To allow the sale to wash the 
claim entirely of the cloud would deprive the trustee of one of 
the tools the Bankruptcy Code gives trustees to collect 
assets—asking the bankruptcy court to disallow problematic 
claims.  Accordingly, interpreting § 502(d) to permit this type 
of “claim washing” would undermine the twin aims of § 
502(d).8   For all of these reasons, the statute’s language is 
                                              
 8 At oral argument before our Court and the District 
Court, an important policy consideration was raised, which 
further supports this interpretation: who should bear the risk 
that avoidable transfers are not returned?  The answer must be 
the claim purchaser for two reasons.  First, claim purchasers 
voluntarily choose to take part in the bankruptcy process.  
Claim purchasers, who are typically sophisticated entities, 
“are aware of, or should be aware of, the risks and 
uncertainties” in the bankruptcy process.  Enron Corp. v. 
Avenue Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.) 
(Enron I), 340 B.R. 180, 202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated 
and remanded by Enron II, 379 B.R. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007).  Because they choose to voluntarily take part in this 
risky process, it is only fair to require them to bear the risk 
that the original claimant will not return an avoidable transfer.  
Second, claim purchasers are in a position to mitigate 
12 
 
properly interpreted to mean that the potential disallowance 
runs with the claim.  
 
 Moreover, the legislative history supports this 
conclusion.  The legislative history provides that § 502(d) is 
“derived from present law,” which, as the Bankruptcy Court 
noted, was section 57(g) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.9  
H.R. Rep. 95-595, at 354 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6310.  Section 57(g) provided: 
 
                                                                                                     
disallowance risk, whereas the other creditors are not.  A 
claim purchaser can perform due diligence on the original 
claimant and estimate the risk of disallowance.  The claim 
purchaser can then account for this risk when determining the 
price to pay for a claim.  Additionally, a claim purchaser may 
shift the risk of disallowance back to the original claimant 
through an indemnity clause in the transfer agreement.   
 9 Even if the legislative history were not so clear, we 
would still consider section 57(g) because courts are 
“reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the 
[Bankruptcy] Code, however vague the particular language 
under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-
Code practice that is not the subject of at least some 
discussion in the legislative history.”  Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 
U.S. 410, 419 (1992).  Indeed, other courts have recognized 
that section 57(g) is relevant to the interpretation of § 502(d).  
See In re LaRoche Indus., Inc., 284 B.R. 406, 409 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2002) (examining a case interpreting section 57(g) when 
faced with an issue arising under § 502(d)); In re America’s 
Shopping Channel, Inc., 110 B.R. 5, 7-8 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 
1990) (same); In re Mid Atl. Fund, Inc., 60 B.R. 604, 610 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same). 
13 
 
The claims of creditors who have received or 
acquired preferences, liens, conveyances, 
transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or 
voidable under this title, shall not be allowed 
unless such creditors shall surrender such 
preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, 
assignments, or encumbrances. 
 
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 473 n.5 (1966) (quoting 
section 57(g)). 
 
 In Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13 (8th Cir. 1902), the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit interpreted section 
57(g) as it applied to a claimant who purchased promissory 
notes from a bank that received a preference.  117 F. at 14.  
The Swarts court held that the “[t]he disqualification of a 
claim for allowance created by a preference inheres in and 
follows every part of the claim, whether retained by the 
original creditor or transferred to another, until the preference 
is surrendered.”  Id. at 15.  Thus, the case law interpreting 
section 57(g) is consistent with our interpretation of § 
502(d).10  
                                              
 10 In an attempt to distinguish Swarts, ASM cites to In 
re Wood & Locker, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19501 (W.D. 
Tex. June 17, 1988).  The Wood & Locker court held that 
Swarts was only applicable to cases where the original 
claimant or a transferee received “provable and traceable 
direct benefits by the payment of the preferences.”  Id. at *8.  
ASM contends that since it did not receive a provable and 
traceable direct benefit from the preference payment, it 
should not be saddled with paying the preference.  Appellant 
Br. at 22.  Neither ASM nor the Wood & Locker court, 
14 
 
 Finally, because ASM included provisions in the 
Assignment Agreements that directly deal with risks 
particular to bankruptcy, it is evident that ASM was aware 
that disallowance could potentially attach to, and travel with, 
the Claims.  Thus, ASM’s conduct when negotiating and 
entering into the Assignment Agreements is consistent with 
our interpretation of  § 502(d).   
 
 In short, because § 502(d) permits the disallowance of 
a claim that was originally owned by a person or entity who 
received a voidable preference that remains unreturned, the 
cloud on the claim continues until the preference payment is 
returned, regardless of whether the person or entity holding 
the claim received the preference payment.11 
                                                                                                     
however, explain why § 502(d) requires proof of a traceable 
direct benefit to the entity who possesses the claim.  Instead, 
they both make this assertion without analysis of the statutory 
text.  Once the text is analyzed, it is clear that the plain 
language of § 502(d) does not require proof of a benefit from 
the avoidable transfer.  Thus, ASM’s lack of a benefit from 
the preferences is irrelevant to the question before the Court.   
 11 In addition to the Bankruptcy Court in this case, two 
other bankruptcy courts have reached the same conclusion: 
Enron I, 340 B.R. at 199 (holding that a claim in the hands of 
a transferee “should be disallowed to the same extent that 
such claim would be subject to disallowance in the hands of 
the transferor”), and In re Metiom, Inc., 301 B.R. 634, 642-43 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that because § 502(d) 
“disallows the claim . . . [t]he claim and the defense to the 
claim under [§] 502(d) cannot be altered by the claimant’s 
subsequent assignment of the claim to another entity . . . that 
has not received an avoidable transfer.”).   
15 
 
                                                                                                     
 Two district courts have reached opposite conclusions.  
In Enron II, the District Court viewed the language of § 
502(d) as focusing “on the claimant as opposed to the claim” 
and this led it to “conclu[de] that disallowance is a personal 
disability of a claimant, not an attribute of the claim.”  379 
B.R. at 443.  It then proceeded to rely on state law to 
determine the impact of this “personal disability” and 
concluded that whether a claim suffered a disability depended 
upon how it was conveyed to the transferee.  Specifically, the 
District Court held that disallowance under § 502(d) is a 
personal disability of particular claimants and not an attribute 
of a claim, unless the transferee took the claim by assignment, 
as opposed to by sale.  Enron II, 379 B.R. at 439-45.  The 
District Court stated that an assignee “stands in the shoes of 
the assignor” and therefore takes the claim with “whatever 
limitations it had in the hands of the assignor,” id. at 435-36 
(citations and internal quotations omitted), but a purchaser of 
the same claim is not subject to any personal disabilities of 
the transferor.  Id. at 436.      
 Enron II’s reliance on this supposed state law 
distinction may also be problematic for several reasons.  First, 
the state law on which it relies does not provide a distinction 
between assignments and sales.  Second, resort to state law in 
a bankruptcy case must be done with care.  See Int’l Shoe Co. 
v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (“The power of Congress 
to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States is unrestricted and paramount.”); 
In re Boston Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 291 F.3d 111, 126 (1st Cir. 
2002) (observing that if a state law dictated a result 






 ASM also argues that the claims should not be 
disallowed because it purchased its claims in “good faith” and 
is therefore entitled to the protections of a good faith 
purchaser under 11 U.S.C. § 550(b).   Section 550(b) 
provides: 
 
The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) 
of this section from-- 
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including 
satisfaction or securing of a present or 
antecedent debt, in good faith, and without 
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer 
avoided; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith 
transferee of such transferee. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 550(b).  An application of the plain language of 
the statue to the facts of this case shows that ASM is not 
entitled to a defense under § 550(b). 
 
 First, § 550(b) is not applicable to ASM.  Section 
550(b) protects a good faith transferee who purchases 
property of the estate that is avoidable under the various 
avoidance sections.  11 U.S.C. § 550(a), (b); see Wasserman 
v. Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2003).   ASM did not 
purchase property of the estate.  ASM purchased claims 
against the Debtors’ estates.  A claim against an estate is not 
property of that estate.  Enron I, 340 B.R. at 206 (“[A] claim 
as defined under [§] 101(5), is not, and has never been, 
considered property of the estate (it is being asserted against) 
under [§] 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.”).  Thus, on its face, § 




 Second, there is no reason or precedent to extend the 
“principles” of § 550(b) to protect ASM.  Claim purchasers 
are entities who knowingly and voluntarily enter the 
bankruptcy process.  Thus, a purchaser should know that it is 
taking on the risks and uncertainties attendant to the 
bankruptcy process.  Indeed, if the bankruptcy process were 
not risky and uncertain, claimants might be less likely to sell 
their claims to a claim purchaser.  Put differently, a claim 
purchaser’s opportunity to profit is partly created by the risks 
inherent in bankruptcy.  Disallowance of a claim pursuant to 
§ 502(d) is among these risks.   
 
 Relatedly, while ASM claims it lacked knowledge of 
the avoidablity of the transfers, ASM could have protected 
itself from the risk of disallowance by reviewing the Debtors’ 
publicly available SOFAs, which would have put it on notice 
of the Claims’ vulnerability to preference attacks, and 
performing due diligence on the Original Claimants.  At 
bottom, ASM voluntarily exposed itself to a risk that it had 
the ability to investigate before acquiring the claims.  
Conscious of this risk, it included indemnity and restitution 
provisions in the Assignment Agreements.  ASM is in a better 
position than the estate to protect itself against the Original 
Claimants going out of business by factoring this possibility 
in to the price of the claim.  Accordingly, in this case, 
extending § 550(b)’s “principles” beyond the plain statutory 




 For all of these reasons, we will affirm. 
